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IMMUTABLE OR MOVEABLE INTERSTATE RIVER
BOUNDARIES: OHIO v. KENTUCKY
Natural monuments, such as rivers and mountains, often constitute
state lines, providing logical and easily perceived borders.' Despite
their practicality, such boundaries engender interstate disputes that
predate even the Constitution.2 The Supreme Court, sitting in its
original jurisdiction,3 has long cited convenience and avoidance of
1. The practice dates back to ancient international law whereby countries sepa-
rated by rivers were "presumed to use this natural division as their boundary.
Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 374, 379-80 (1820). See generaly E.
VATTEL, 1 THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. 22 (Philadelphia, 1869) (1st ed. London 1758).
Municipal boundaries of cities and towns established along such interstate rivers
often extend to the state line provided by such rivers. Vermont v. New Hampshire,
189 U.S. 593, 599 (1933).
2. Disputes involving eleven states raged when the Constitution was adopted in
1787. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723-24 (1838). At least
one of these controversies, that between Rhode Island and Massachusetts, involved a
river boundary. Id. at 663. The Supreme Court has dealt with the problem since
New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1 (1799). See generaly Note, The Original
Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, I1 STAN. L. REv. 665, 701 (1959).
3. The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction emanates from the Constitution.
U.S. CO ST. art. III, § 2. Moreover, 28 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1) provides the Court with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over "controversies between two or more states,"
such as the principal case. In fact, the first case in which a state sued another state
under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction involved an interstate boundary dis-
pute. New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1 (1799). Such original jurisdiction
arose from the need for some neutral tribunal to resolve interstate conflicts; otherwise,
states Acting independently could only resolve such controversies through either dip-
lomatic negotiation or force. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 109 (3rd
ed. 1976). Cases heard under the Court's original jurisdiction constitute a statistically
small part of the Court's workload. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1, 278 (1975).
The Court exercises its original jurisdiction even though boundary disputes involve
political questions. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 639 (1892). Language in
some early cases suggest that one state suing another must allege serious injury or the
imminent threat thereof to successfully invoke even the Court's exclusive original ju-
risdiction. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934); Louisiana v. Texas, 176
U.S. 1, 15 (1900). Other cases state, however, that most of the interstate cases taken
under the Court's exclusive jurisdiction involve boundary disputes. Wisconsin v. Pel-
ican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 288 (1888). The language requiring serious injury allega-
tions in suits between states most likely constituted a warning against bootstrapping a
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future litigation as the guiding principles in settling such interstate
controversies.4 The fluctuating character of interstate rivers, how-
ever, makes compliance with these guidelines difficult. In Ohio v.
Kentucky,5 the Supreme Court fulfilled neither of these goals as it set
the Ohio-Kentucky boundary immutably at the 1792 low-water level
on the Ohio River's north shore.
Until the late eighteenth century, Virginia and four other states
claimed rights to portions of an area now comprising the states of
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minne-
sota.6 Following a request by Congress, 7 the claimant states ceded
their rights in this land to the federal government.8 Virginia's cession
included land now constituting the southern halves of Indiana, Ohio,
and Illinois; the Ohio River marked the boundary between these
three states and what later became Kentucky. 9 The Supreme Court
controversy into the Court's original jurisdiction by joining a state in a case involving
injury only to certain individual citizens. 176 U.S. at 16. At any rate, the opinions
stemming from interstate boundary disputes typically make no reference to the degree
of harm at stake. In the principal case, the record contained no evidence of the de-
gree, if any, of change in the river caused by the dams which gave rise to the litigation
(See note 11 infra). Exceptions of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to the Report of
the Special Master at 25, Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335 (1980).
4. These principles originated in Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
374 (1820), which also stated that such principles should not be overcome by the type
of "technical perplexities" that often influence private contract relations. Id. at 383-
84. See also New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 378 (1934) (the precepts to be
obeyed in the division of waters dividing states were those of international law); Ver-
mont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593, 606 (1933) (construe documents fixing inter-
state boundaries with a view toward possible convenience and avoidance of
controversy); Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381, 424 (1851) (commending
the selection of a line as fixed and certain as practicable and representing the bound-
ary states would naturally have in mind); Purvine v. Hathaway, 393 P. 2d 181, 183
(1964) (thalweg boundary, changing with thread of the stream, serves convenience in
ascertaining border location and discouragement of boundary disputes).
5. 444 U.S. 335 (1980).
6. C. MOORE, THE NORTHWEST UNDER THREE FLAGS 65-66 (1900).
7. Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 374, 377 (1820).
8. Id.
9. The language in the acts of cession indicated that Virginia ceded all her land
"northwest of the Ohio River." 11 LAWS OF VA. 326, 327 (Hening 1822); 1 LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 472, 474 (1815). This language meant that Virginia retained the
river bed of the Ohio River, according to the ancient law of nations which holds that
when one state possesses land divided by a river and cedes to another land on one
side, she retains the river bed. 18 U.S. at 379. See R. TYLER, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF BOUNDARIES AND FENCES 78 (1874). Kentucky came into being as a district
of Virginia, attaining statehood in 1792. Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 480, 503
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held in Indiana v. Kentucky l0 that the actual line forming the border
between those two states followed the low-water mark of 1792, the
year of Kentucky's statehood."
In 1955, the federal government began construction of new high-
lift dams along the full stretch of the Ohio River. 12 These dams grad-
ually moved the shoreline inland.' 3 Ohio claimed its border with
Kentucky remained at the river's north shore low-water level as it
existed in 1792.14 Kentucky, however, contended that the current
low-water level on the north shore comprised the boundary, subject
to gradual modifications in the river's course. 5 Consequently, Ohio
sought a boundary determination from the Supreme Court.16 The
Court, relying primarily on Indiana v. Kentucky, approved Ohio's
claim. 
7
(1890). In so doing, Kentucky succeeded to the "ancient right and possession" of the
river bed of the Ohio River. Id. at 479, 508.
10. Id. at 479.
11. Id. at 508.
12. The federal government erected dims along the Ohio to replace those built
between 1910-1929. Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 643 (1973). Two of these high
lift dams, the Captain Meldahl Dam about 34 miles upstream of Cincinnati and the
Greenup Dam, lie between Ohio and Kentucky. Dams located between Ohio and
other states, however, also affect the Ohio River water level between Kentucky and
Ohio. The Markland Dam pool originating in the Ohio River between Indiana and
Kentucky affects the Ohio-Kentucky boundary, including the Cincinnati area. Tele-
phone interview with William E. Dreisle, Chief of the Survey Branch for the Louis-
ville, Kentucky branch of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Louisville, Kentucky
(Jan. 8, 1981).
13. Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 643 (1973).
14. Id. at 642.
15. Exceptions of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to the Report of the Special
Master at 2, 444 U.S. 335 (1980).
16. Ohio v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 982 (1966). Ohio moved for leave to file an
amended complaint in 1971, Ohio v. Kentucky, 404 U.S. 933 (1971). It sought a new
determination that the boundary line was the center of the Ohio River, or alterna-
tively, the 1792 low-water line on the northshore. The Court, however, denied this
motion on recommendation, primarily on the basis of Ohio's long acquiescence to
some north shoreline border. Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641 (1973). The only un-
resolved issue was whether the current low-water mark or that of 1792 fixes the actual
border.
17. While the actual location of the 1792 boundary has yet to be completely dis-
cerned, officials working on the project speculate that it does not lie inland of the
modern day shoreline. Telephone interview with Michael Szollosi, Special Counsel
to the Attorney General of Ohio, in Columbus, Ohio (Jan. 8, 1981). Cincinnati offi-
cials followed the litigation with great interest as that city lies along the Ohio-Ken-
tucky border. Id. So also have officials in Huntington, W. Va., since that city
1981]
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Normally courts construe a river boundary to be the middle of the
river's main navigable or most used channel.18 The Court selects this
line, called the thalweg, 19 to ensure the states' concurrent jurisdiction
currently seeks to annex all land between its current city limits and the state line on
the river. Id. The principal case affects that action since the Virginia Cession also
established the Ohio boundary with West Virginia.
18. Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 1 (1893). It may be closer to one border than to
another. C. BROWN, BOUNDARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES, § 225 (1957). In
contrast, the middle of the river refers to the middle of the river bed, as defined by the
banks of the river. 147 U.S. at 1.
19. 18 U.S. at 379; C. BROWN, supra note 18, at § 236.
The thalweg rule and all the doctrine in this section comprise the federal common
law developed by the Court to govern interstate boundary disputes. See notes 26, 27
infra; State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 375 (1977). This
federal common law only applies to the narrow issue of interstate boundary location.
Id. It should not be confused with the notion of a federal common law rejected in
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The latter concept refers to the once
supposed existence of a "transcendental body of law outside of any particular state
but obligatory within it" until changed by statute. Id. at 79. Erie went on to hold that
in the absence of state statutes, state common law applied. Id. The interstate river
boundary common law falls under the express exception to Erie of "matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress." Id. The Constitution puts
under Congress' power the admission of states to the Union, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,
and the approval of all interstate agreements, including those referring to interstate
boundaries, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
Once the boundary becomes established, ownership of the lands abutting the river
comes under the jurisdiction of the property of the law of the state involved. Barney
v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877). State law also governs whether an original patent
reached to a river, Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 342 (1906). Furthermore, it deter-
mines how land on either side of the interstate boundary is disposed of as between
public and private ownership. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 175-76 (1918).
Such dispositions, however, cannot alter the federally designated line. Id.
This arrangement reflects the "cardinal rule" of equality between states that no
state shall individually impose legislation on any other. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46, 97 (1907). One commentator suggests that the alternative would consist of a set of
choice of law rules whereby the Court would choose the law of one state having a
particular relation to the transaction and impose the law of one "quasi-sovereign" on
another. Note, The Original Jurisdiction o0/he United States Supreme Court, 1 1 STAN.
L. REv. 665, 683 (1959). Interstate boundary disputes thus involve the necessary
"overriding" federal interest in having a uniform rule of decision necessary to justify
the use of federal common law. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
421-27 (1964); Hinderlider v. La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938); Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 1 I STAN.
L. REv. 665, 682-83 (1959).
Nothing precludes the Court from moulding this common law from principles
originating in federal law, state law, or international law; the Court has no limit in
doing so other than the requirements of reaching a sensible solution for the contro-
versy at hand. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931); Kansas v.
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over the riverbed.2" The thalweg rule became the general rule for
interstate river boundaries in Iowa Y. Illinois,2 wherein the Court set
the line between those states at the middle of the Mississippi's main
channel.
22
The thalweg rule does not apply, however, when language used in
historical documents establishing state boundaries indicates a border
set on some other line.23 State acts of cession, historic treaties, and
Colorado,185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902). See also Note, W"at Rule of Decision Should
Control Interstate Controversies, 21 HARV. L. REV. 132 (1907).
The federal common law applies when a question of interstate boundary location
arises In a case not heard under the Court's original jurisdiction. Rust Land & Lum-
ber Co. v. Jackson, 250 U.S. 71 (1919); Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381
(1851).
20. In so construing this thalweg boundary, the law presumes that the right of
navigation is common to the states thus separated. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S.
158, 169 (1918); H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 192 (8th ed.
1866).
When a line other than the thalweg is chosen, as in the principal case, supplemen-
tary acts may be passed to ensure this equal right. E.g., An Act Concerning the Erec-
tion of the District of Kentucky into an Independent State, ch. 14, § 11, Virginia Acts
(1789). Earlier cases discuss the equal right under an "equal footing" doctrine. Pol-
lard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845). This doctrine originates from the
theory that the original states succeeded to all rights of the English Crown. Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
21. 147 U.S. 1 (1893). See also New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 379-80
(1934); Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1920).
22. Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 13 (1893).
23. See Washington v. Oregon, 211 U.S. 127 (1908) (Courts have no power to
change the boundary thus prescribed and establish it at the middle of some other
channel). Such explicit language precludes the application of both the thalweg rule
and the equal footing doctrine. See Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 710 (1973).
Sometimes the specific language of the historic documents establishes the boundaries
in the middle of the main channel anyway. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 161
(1918) (Court held boundary between the two states follows the middle of the Missis-
sippi's main channel of navigation based on the act admitting Arkansas to the Union
in 1836).
The meaning of the language in such a document, however, often resides in the
historical data surrounding the boundary's establishment, as well as the physical char-
acteristics of the landmark itself. In Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606 (1923), treaty
provisions used three rivers as part of the Oklahoma-Texas boundary. The provisions
expressly locate the boundary along the western bank of the Sabine River, and the
southern bank of the Arkansas River. When the Arkansas River border segment met
the Red River, however, the treaty instructed that the boundary "follow" the course
of the Red westward and then "cross" the Red and run due north on the Arkansas
River. Id., at 625.
The Court recognized that the failure to expressly designate a bank boundary on
the Red River might indicate a different purpose from that of the shoreline borders on
19811
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
congressional acts of state admission have accordingly indicated non-
thalweg borders, often following shorelines. In Oklahoma P. Texas,24
for example, the three different rivers dividing those states all consti-
tuted shoreline borders by the terms of a treaty between the United
States and Spain.25
Both thalweg boundaries and boundaries set by historical language
change with the gradual, insensible movements of accretion.26 The
accretion rule arises from fairness considerations and a realization
that natural changes in rivers are unintentional and expected.27
the other rivers. Three factors overcame this suggestion: 1) the instruction to cross
the Red River and run north, implying that the preceding course had been on the
south side of the river, 2) the declaration in the treaty that use of the waters and
navigation of the three rivers should be common; and, 3) the historical data of the
negotiations culminating in the treaty, which indicated that the framers and signers
had intended a river bank boundary for each river. Id., at 625-26.
24. 260 U.S. 606 (1923).
25. Id. at 625.
26. The Court applied the accretion doctrine to a thalweg boundary in Mississippi
v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289 (1974).
The accretion doctrine comprises part of the federal common law the Court devel-
oped to govern interstate boundary disputes. See note 19 supra. This common law
categorizes change in a river as either accretive (gradual and imperceptible), J.
GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS, § 155 (1883), or avulsive (sudden and
dramatic), Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 360-61 (1892). In the typical case where
two states each hold to the thalweg, the borderline will shift with the gradual, insensi-
ble changes of accretion. The rule comes from the common law governing private
riparian landowners and is "in like manner recognized where the boundaries between
States or nations are, by prescription or treaty, found in running water." Id. at 361; 1.
HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 138 (2d rev. ed. 1945). The principle also applies to
inundation of land by water, such as allegedly occurred in the principal case (see note
13 supra), because of the gradual, non-violent character of the change. Shively v.
Bowley, 152 U.S. 1, 35 (1894). See also United States v. Claridge, 416 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 961 (1970) (changes in the Colorado River's course
caused by construction of Hoover Dam are accretive); C. BROWN, supra note 18, at
§ 230, 203-04.
27. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 362 (1892). The rule also serves the principle
of boundary convenience, which in such instances outweighs the inconvenience that
the minor, imperceptible decrease of soil due to accretion causes the landowner. Id.
A different result follows an avulsive change, wherein a river suddenly abandons its
old channel and cuts a new course. In such case, the borderline remains the center of
the old channel as it existed just prior to the avulsion. Id. The rule, again, serves the
convenience criteria since the river's new path may cause a state to suffer a loss or
large portions of land greater than the benefit of keeping the river in its new course as
the boundary. Id.
Note that so long as the old channel remains a running stream, though it may no
longer be the main channel, the boundary after the avulsion is still subject to changes
from erosion and accretion. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 174-75 (1918). The
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Thus, in Missouri v. Nebraska,2" a case involving a river border set by
the acts admitting those states to the Union, the Court bluntly re-
jected Missouri's argument that the boundary line remained
permanently fixed. The Court reasoned that Congress did not mean
to preclude established rules governing changes in interstate rivers,
even in the presence of historical documents.29
The thalweg and historical documents rules may also be precluded
when litigating states have over long periods of time implicitly recog-
nized a particular line as the boundary, evidenced by their acts and
statements.30 This acquiescence doctrine controls border disputes
when the facts provide a basis for its application, establishing the
boundary at the line thus recognized. 3' Thus, the Court dismissed
the complaint in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,32 stating that even if
the border selected by a joint-state commission constituted error, the
occupation of the disputed property by Massachusetts for two centu-
ries and the lack of protest by Rhode Island for 40 years precluded a
boundary becomes fixed when the water becomes stagnant, all accretion having en-
ded. The Court construes the gradual filling up of the bed not as an accretion, but as
an ultimate effect of the avulsion.
The Court makes no distinction in applying both the accretion and avulsion doc-
trines as to whether the changes in the river result from entirely natural processes or
artificial, man-made causes. St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68
(1874).
28. 196 U.S. 23 (1904). The historic language in Missouri came from the Act of
Congress admitting Missouri to the Union, 3 Stat. 545, ch. 22, a subsequent act ex-
tending the western boundary of Missouri to the Missouri River, 5 Stat. 34, ch. 86,
and the 1867 Act of Congress admitting Nebraska in the Union, 14 Stat. 391, ch. 36;
196 U.S. at 25-27.
29. Id. at 36-37. The Court clearly stated that shoreline boundaries also remain
subject to accretion in Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606, 626 (1923).
30. Such a line becomes conclusive even if it varies from the line established in
the original grant. The Court regards such border not to be the result of an aliena-
tion, but rather as the definition of the "true and ancient boundary." Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 522-23 (1893). The rule reflects the desire to maintain "the
tranquility of the people, the safety of the states," and the "happiness of the human
race" by allowing the conventions of practice to settle matters that would otherwise
remain uncertain. E. VATTEL, 2 THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 11, § 149 (Philadelphia,
1869) (1st ed. London 1758). Evidence used to establish acquiescence includes the
state's service of process within the land involved, evidence of citizens' voting loca-
tions, evidence of land records to the controverted property being stored in a particu-
lar state, or records of taxes assessed by a particular state on the land, Indiana v.
Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 510 (1890).
31. Id.
32. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 591 (1846).
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change at the time of this case.3 3
While the Supreme Court has not directly considered the effect of
accretion on an acquiescence boundary, it held inArkansas v. Tennes-
see34 that accretion to land which became part of Tennessee, after an
avulsion thrust it across the Mississippi thalweg boundary, by its joint
acquiescence with Arkansas belonged to Tennessee. 35 The Court
suggested no basis for denying this result when accretion affects an
acquiescence boundary rather than acquiescence to land within and
not actually part of a state boundary.
In Indiana v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court again applied the ac-
quiescence doctrine in a dispute involving the Ohio River interstate
boundary established by the original Virginia cession.36 The Indiana
controversy involved a question of ownership of Green River Island
just east of Evansville, Indiana. 37 When Kentucky attained state-
hood, the island came clearly within its jurisdiction. Intervening
years, however, saw the low-water line recede to a point where a
mere bayou separated the island from Indiana.31 The Court recog-
nized that convenience might have been better served by granting
jurisdiction to the more proximate state, Indiana.39 Instead, it prop-
erly applied the acquiescence doctrine which put the land under Ken-
tucky's control, based on the exclusive and previously unchallenged
jurisdiction she had exercised over the island.4"
The Court in Indiana also announced that the border established
would remain immutable at the same position it occupied when Ken-
tucky became a state in 1792. 1 While this language contradicted the
accretion rule generally applied to boundaries,42 the Court did no
apparent harm due to the fact that the boundary established correctly
resulted from acquiescence.43
33. Id. at 638-39.
34. 310 U.S. 563 (1940).
35. Id. at 572.
36. 136 U.S. 479, 483 (1890).
37. Id. at 509.
38. Id. at 508.
39. Id. at 518.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 508.
42. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
43. The evidence indicated that in the 70 years of Indiana's statehood preceding
this suit, she had never asserted legal claim to the tract in question, nor any right of
[Vol. 22:271
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The Court in Ohio v. Kentucky relied heavily on the Indiana hold-
ing that the Ohio River boundary remained immutable from its in-
ception," since the southern border of both Indiana and Ohio
originated in the same Virginia cession.45 The Court thus deemed as
controlling the Indiana interpretation of the northern Kentucky bor-
der as an unchanging line, without considering that the two cases are
clearly distinguishable. The Ohio case lacks the dispositive factor of
acquiescence present in the earlier case." Neither Ohio nor Ken-
tucky could point to a preponderance of evidence indicating that the
sovereignty or ownership. Conversely, evidence readily showed Kentucky's history of
jurisdiction, including the passage of laws declaring the land within her boundaries,
federal and state court suits involving parties claiming under Kentucky grants, and
Kentucky taxes assessed on the land. Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 515-17
(1890).
The opaque quality of the Court's Indiana opinion makes its reliance on acquies-
cence less than clear. One can argue, as did counsel for Indiana, that such a founda-
tion clearly violates the common law doctrine nullum tempus occurrit regi (the passage
of time does not abrogate claims of sovereignties). Id. at 500. The Court ignored this
objection; perhaps it used the language stating that the Virginia Cession boundary
remained immutable since 1792 to camouflage the problem. This suggestion loses
credibility in view of the Court's long-established precedent that acquiescence applies
to states as well as private landowners. California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125, 131
(1980); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 310 U.S. 563, 569 (1940); Rhode Island v. Massachu-
setts, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 591, 639 (1845); Property: The FixedLaw of Changing Bounda-
ries, 41 Miss. L. J. 444, 448-49 (1970). In fact, a mere three years after Indiana, its
author cited its acquiescence language as precedent for the statement that interstate
acquiescence conclusively establishes interstate boundary rights, Virginia v. Tennes-
see, 148 U.S. 503, 523 (1893). Another fact disserving the nullum tempus occurrit regi
objection is that the doctrine does not apply to the bringing of suits between states.
Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of Louisville v. Buckner, 48 Fed. 533, 536 (1891).
Despite the ambiguity of Indiana's opinion, the wording of the acquiescence discus-
sion strongly points to its dispositive character in the case ("The long acquiescence of
Indiana in the claim of Kentucky. . . forbid. . . any disturbance of Kentucky in her
possession of the island and jurisdiction over it."), 136 U.S. at 518.
44. Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335, 339 (1980).
45. See notes 6-9 and accompanying text supra.
46. In the principal case, Justice Powell, writing for the Court's three dissenting
members, questioned the precedential value of Indiana on its own merits, since it
completely contradicted Handly's Lessee v. Anthony. Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S.
335, 344 (1980). Handly's Lessee v. Anthony involved a small peninsula separated
from the northern shore only by a bayou, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 374, 375 (1820). In
declaring the peninsula part of Indiana, the Court pointed to the inconvenience that
would arise if the land came under Kentucky's jurisdiction since the Ohio River sepa-
rated the two. Id. at 381. In Indiana, the Court cited the language in Handly's Lessee
v. Anthony establishing Kentucky's jurisdiction over the river, but then abruptly
1981]
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other side had acquiesced to the borderline it promoted.47 Although
the southern boundary for Ohio, like Indiana, differs from other
boundaries in its location on the north bank rather than the thalweg,
cases like Missouri v. Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Texas clearly reject
the notion that such a distinction justifies abandoning common law
rules of boundary change.48
Since neither state in Ohio v. Kentucky acquiesced to the border
advocated by the other, the acquiescence doctrine did not apply as it
did in Indiana v. Kentucky. Thus, the Ohio Court mistakenly relied
on Indiana. Neither did the thalweg doctrine apply in Ohio due to
the presence of historical documents in this case establishing a shore-
line boundary. The only applicable doctrine in this case, accordingly,
was the historical documents doctrine.
Applying the doctrine to the present case, the river boundary
should have been located at the present-day low-water line, which
represents the 1792 low-water mark as modified by subsequent accre-
tion and erosion. Instead of applying this doctrine, the Court errone-
states that the boundary should nevertheless be set at the low-water mark existing
when Kentucky became a state, Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 508 (1890).
In so doing, the Court created the exact inconvenience prohibited in Handly's
Lessee v. Anthony by granting jurisdiction of an island on the north side of the Ohio
to the more distant state of Kentucky. Powell conjectured that Justice Field in Indi-
ana had effectively overruled the case on which he claimed to rely, 444 U.S. at 344.
Indiana may still be reconciled with Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, however, in that
both cases granted jurisdiction to that state which had historically exercised its sover-
eignty over the disputed territory, 136 U.S. at 515-17; 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 384.
47. The Special Master appointed by the Court to gather facts in Ohio suggested
that some elements of acquiescence existed. He declined, however, to take evidence
from the states on this specific point. Report of the Special Master at 13-14, 444 U.S.
335 (1980). Nevertheless, the litigants proffered such evidence in their briefs. Ohio
cited Kentucky legislative documents referring to the 1792 low-water marks as the
boundary; Kentucky countered this with three bridge agreements Ohio engaged in
which stated that the location of the Ohio's north shore low-water mark as deter-
mined by the Corps of Engineers should define the boundary between Ohio and Ken-
tucky. The Special Master discounted these contracts, however, surmising that this
admission occurred to expedite the bridge construction. He also pointed out that the
contracts arose concurrently with the Kentucky opinions citing the 1792 boundary.
Id. The Special Master subsequently recommended that the Court not decide the
case on acquiescence grounds, but merely follow the holding of Indiana, Id. at 12.
The Majority opinion still gave lip-service to the acquiescence evidence against Ken-
tucky, designating it as of "no little interest," Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335, 340
(1980).
48. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
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ously held that the boundary between Ohio and Kentucky remained
immutably at the 1792 mark, without regard for accretion.
The Court's Ohio decision demonstrates indifference to the guiding
principles it previously expounded for boundary disputes. The Court
disserves convenience by selecting the more inconvenient line avail-
able.49 The dams which led to the controversy having moved the
shoreline inland, the 1792 boundary now lies probably entirely un-
derwater." The current-day low-water mark, by contrast, can be
seen through much of the year.5 '
The Court, moreover, disserves the goal of avoiding controversy by
mechanically repeating the eccentric and unnecessary declaration of
an immutable boundary from Indiana v. Kentucky, again without ar-
ticulating a rationale for determining when a border remains un-
changed. States contesting a common river boundary can determine
which way the Court will rule in their situation only by bringing suit
before the Court.
David Hemingway
49. And, as in Indiana v. Kentucky (see note 40 and accompanying text supra),
the Court expressly admitted doing so. 444 U.S. at 340.
50. See note 17 supra.
51. Telephone interview with William E. Kreisle, Chief of the Survey Branch for
the Louisville, Kentucky branch of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Louisville,
Kentucky (Jan. 8, 1981).
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